Aid and Afghanistan

Hooray! Another (self described) “crazy conservative” has responded to my blog! And its a good one. The response was to a previous post, “Human Security Over Military Security in Afghanistan?”.

Doesn’t the military presence there help a little with some of that security stuff? So shouldn’t it be we’re spending $107M a day on human security in Afghanistan? Even if you want to prorate that $100M somehow because we’re acting to advance our own interests as well, I think it should still count as helping them out to some degree.

Contrasting the two numbers as if it’s an either/or thing or a case of mixed up priorities doesn’t seem right. I seriously doubt the $2.5B a year (one of the highest rates of aid to a country in the world) could be used to very good effect to relieve suffering in Afghanistan without the (imperfect) stability provided by the miltary presence there. The Taliban didn’t seem like they were too keen on facilitating the free flow of aid in the country.

I’m not sure what goes into those figures, but my guess is a military deployment comes with a fairly high fixed cost. What with salaries and leases and food and fuel and extra wear and tear on equipment and such. So implying that we might be able to flip it or something and spend $7M a day on the military presence and $100M a day on other aid seems naive at best.

I’d also be interested to know what they’re spending that $2.5B a year in aid on. Are they able to efficiently process all that aid and get it to the right people? Is it getting siphoned off by government officials on the way down? Are their spending priorities right? Are they spending it to build a new building in the capitol when people need food out in the mountains? Do they have enough food but they aren’t able to get it to the people that need it? Are they doing everything right but they just need more? How much more?

And all of this doesn’t even begin to address things like whether aid actually works in the long run or where it should come from.

To Respond…

First let me say that I chose poorly for the title of that post. It did indeed read like an either/or situation and in retrospect, not such a great idea. Even if there was a question mark at the end.

You’re right to say that the money spent on the military is part of human security, but the $100m is being spent on one type of security and even in a very narrow way at that. As I understand it, our troops are there to defeat the Taliban and train Afghans to do so as well but to do any general policing. The American troops are not subject to the orders of the Afghan government, and the American government can only govern Afghanistan in a limited fashion and not without risking a perception of colonialism. The best way to improve all aspects of human security is to do as much as possible in each sector simultaneously and not put one over the other or even act on them one at a time.

The Need for Military and Police

While an increased international troop presence for a substantial period of time can go a long way in protecting local populations while the police forces build up, it may not be the most practical option. The region is not supportive of a prolonged US and NATO presence and their cooperation is key.

“Proposals for improving the security situation focus on sending additional international forces, building larger national security forces in Afghanistan, and training and equipping Pakistan’s security forces, which are organized for conflict with India, for domestic counterinsurgency. But none of these proposals is sufficient to meet the current, let alone future, threats…Securing Afghanistan and its region will require an international presence for many years, but only a regional diplomatic initiative that creates a consensus to place stabilizing Afghanistan ahead of other objectives could make a long-term international deployment possible.” (Ahmed and Rubin)

There is debate on whether the US and the Afghan government should seek to negotiate with some Taliban forces. But these voices acknowledge this is not the only solution and that the military is still needed even if there are negotiations. The question is whether or not such a “quick-fix” solution would yield positive long term results.

The Economist does not rule out negotiations, but takes a cautious approach:

“A more realistic strategy is to isolate the hardliners by cutting deals with individual insurgent commanders, and wooing disaffected tribal groups over to the government side. But that will not happen on a significant scale without two things: greater security, to keep the support of the population and protect those who throw in their lot with the government; and a government that looks credible, legitimate and effective enough to offer a more attractive alternative to the Taliban.” (Wobbly)

In another article from the Economist:

“There is a difference between saying there is no military solution and believing the mission is bound to fail; between trying to draw individual commanders away from the Taliban and sharing power with their leader, Mullah Omar.” (Pessimism)

The Challenge of Rebuilding

Salon writer, Damien Cave, writes that rebuilding Afghanistan is less of a nation-building project than it is a nation-creating one.

“Decades of civil war and foreign invasions have destroyed what little infrastructure previously existed, even as a two-year drought has ruined the country’s ability to feed itself. Most of the educated class that might be willing to create stable government left long ago, and even if they returned, Afghanistan has little history of self-government to fall back on. Add to all of this a rugged terrain that makes any kind of geographic cohesion extremely difficult and you end up with a quagmire that defies description.” (Cave)

If we’re going to build roads in Afghanistan, there must be more than just people with guns. There needs to be a credible, legitimate government which may very well not be Karzai’s. There is also something to be said by the danger posed by a population who has known nothing but war.

“The demographics of the country make extended war even more probable. Afghanistan today is a society of warriors, men who know nothing but war. Not only do many families have no primary breadwinner, because he’s been killed, but “for those men who are still there, the retraining mission is extremely daunting,” says Martha Brill Olcott of the Carnegie Foundation. “They’re not even military men who have experience with discipline. They’re guerrillas.” Getting them to put down their guns will require huge effort, and may not ever succeed. With a ready supply of funders and with so many caves and other places to hide, Taliban soldiers could become guerrillas once again. Even if most of the country wants peace, a small, well-armed minority could disrupt any attempt to rebuild.” (Cave)

The Role of International Aid

There should be no flipping of the numbers, from $100m a day in military and $7m in other areas to $7m in military and then $100m in other areas. Peacebuilders and nation-makers in Afghanistan cannot work without the military, and the success of the military would be extremely limited without them. I don’t know if the $100m is being spent effectively nor do I know if the $7m is being spent effectively as well. I’m not sure you or I can know some of those things, but its always a good idea to put pressure on the administration to make sure no dollar is wasted.

We do know that corruption is a major factor in the distribution of the aid. But like all forms of international aid, it is best done selectively in certain areas of life and subject to conditions. There is no one perfect fit for all countries and they must be evaluated on a case by case basis. But in all cases, the success of the aid is dependent not only on the donors but on the receivers as well. There is no question as to whether international aid in principle works, the question is when does it work best.

References

• Rashid, Ahmed and Rubin, Barnett R. “From Great Game to Grand Bargain: Ending Chaos in Afghanistan and Pakistan”. Foreign Affairs, November/December 2008.
• “No time to go wobbly“. The Economist, October 16, 2008.
• “A surge of pessimism“. The Economist, October 16, 2008.
• Cave, Damien. “Can we rebuild Afghanistan?” Salon.com